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NOTES

The Public Policy Exception to the
Recognition of Foreign Judgments
ABSTRACT

This Note examines the public policy exception to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. The author first examines other
grounds that a United States court can use to refuse to recognize a foreign judgment. An analysis of several cases construing the public policy
exception follows. The author concludes with a suggested analysis for
courtsfaced with the public policy exception.
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I. INTRODUCTION

While United States courts generally recognize and enforce judgments
issued by the courts of foreign states, there are several grounds on which
a United States court can refuse to recognize and enforce such judgments. The public policy exception to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments is perhaps the least well-defined of these exceptions.
In almost any case in which a party seeks recognition and enforcement of
a foreign judgment,' the public policy exception may be raised in opposition; yet United States courts rarely find that the exception warrants
non-recognition of the judgment. This Note examines the requirements
for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Part II and discusses the particular workings of the public policy exception in Part III.
The Note concludes with a proposed analysis for determining the applicability of the public policy exception.
II.

UNITED STATES RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS

A. Recognition versus Enforcement
Courts and litigants often use the terms "recognition" and "enforcement" interchangeably, but there is an important distinction between the
two. Recognition of a foreign judgment occurs when a United States
court finds that a matter has been adequately decided by a foreign court
and does not need to be further litigated in a United States court. 2 Enforcement occurs when a United States court grants the relief ordered by
the foreign judgment.3 Although recognition is a prerequisite to enforcement, 4 it does not guarantee enforcement. 5 In many cases, a party only
1. "Foreign judgment" refers to a "foreign state judgment" as employed in this Note
and does not refer to a judgement issued by a state court of one of the United States.
2. von Mehren & Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country
Judgments in the United States, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37, 38 (1974); see Note,
Recognition of Foreign CountryJudgments-A Casefor Federalization,22 TEX. INT'L

L.J. 331, 332 (1987).
3, Bishop & Burnette, United States Practice Concerningthe Recognition of Foreign
Judgments, 16 INT'L LAW, 425, 428 (1982); von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at
38.
4. See, e.g., Mandel-Mantello v. Treves, 103 Misc. 2d 700, 702, 426 N.Y.S.2d 929,
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seeks recognition of the foreign judgment. For example, a defendant in a
lawsuit may seek recognition of a foreign judgment against a plaintiff
prior to seeking a dismissal of the plaintiff's claim on res judicata
grounds.6 Likewise, a plaintiff may seek recognition of a foreign judgment so that he may use the judgment as "offensive" collateral estoppel
against a defendant.' In most cases, once a United States court recognizes
a foreign judgment, the judgment is entitled to the same enforcement as a
judgment rendered by a United States court.8
B.

The Rationale Behind Recognition

The leading United States precedent on recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments is the 1895 case of Hilton v. Guyot.9 In Hilton, the
United States Supreme Court held that while no state is required to give
effect to the judgments of foreign states, United States courts shall recognize foreign judgments under the principle of comity." ° Although most
subsequent recognition and enforcement cases rely on the comity rationale of Hilton," some rely on res judicata as a policy reason for recogni931 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) ("[O]nly after [recognition can] the question of enforceability . . .be addressed."); von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 38 ("No foreign
judgment can be enforced until it has been recognized . . ").
5. Curacao v.Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1321 n.8 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting
that while the court felt compelled to recognize the foreign judgment, it felt no such
compulsion to enforce the judgment), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974); Victrix Steamship S.S. Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo, 65 Bankr. 466, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that
recognition of a foreign state judgment does not require enforcement), affid, 825 F.2d
709 (2d Cir. 1987).
6. See, e.g., Sangiovanni Hernandez v. Dominicana de Aviacion, C. por A., 556 F.2d
611 (1st Cir. 1977) (allowing defendant in lawsuit in Puerto Rico to use settlement of
plaintiff's claim by a Dominican court to bar plaintiff's suit on res judicata grounds).
7. See, e.g., Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co.,
470 F. Supp. 610, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (allowing defendant to use foreign judgment
as "offensive" collateral estoppel in counter-claim against plaintiff).
8. See, e.g., UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3, 13
U.L.A. 261, 265 (1986) [hereinafter UNIFORM RECOGNITION ACTI ("The foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled
to full faith and credit."); see also Bishop & Burnette, supra note 3, at 429. Recognition,
however, does not always mean that the foreign judgment will be enforced. See supra
note 5.
9. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
10. Id. at 163-64.
11. See, e.g., Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976) (recogniz-

ing a Canadian bankruptcy proceeding based on comity); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972);
see also von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 45 ("Most [courts] are content simply
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tion.12 One court noted that recognition of foreign state judgments may
be "motivated by a desire for reciprocal treatment of American judg13
ments abroad."
At least one commentator proposes additional arguments in favor of
recognizing foreign judgments, including (1) the protection of a successful foreign litigant from harassment or evasive maneuvers; (2) the implementation of a policy that does not make the plaintiff's choice of forum
depend upon the availability of local enforcement; (3) the promotion of a
stable and uniform international order; and (4) the belief that a foreign
forum may be the more appropriate one.14 Whatever the rationale,
United States courts rarely refuse to recognize foreign judgments if the
requirements for recognition are met. 5
C.

State Law versus Federal Law

The Supreme Court has not decided whether federal or state law governs the recognition of foreign judgments.1 While most United States
federal17 and state" courts have held that state law applies to the recognition of foreign judgments, this rule could change with the enactment of
a statute by the federal government or a decision by the United States
Supreme Court. 9 It is important to note that if the foreign judgment
to cite the general principles of comity identified in Hilton .... ").
12. See Sangiovanni Hernandez v. Dominicana de Aviacion, C. por A., 556 F.2d
611, 614 (1st Cir. 1977) (United States courts recognize foreign judgments to promote
the policy behind res judicata "that there must be some end to litigation."); Hunt v. BP
Exploration Co. (Libya), 580 F. Supp. 304, 310 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (recognizing English
judgment on res judicata grounds); see also Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 220, 239-40 (1972).
13. Sangiovanni Hernandez, 556 F.2d at 614.
14. Note, supra note 2, at 333; see also von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of
Foreign Adjudications: Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1601,
1603-04 (1968).
15. See von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 46 (noting that courts, no matter
what their particular reason, tend to recognize foreign judgments).
16. Bishop & Burnette, supra note 3, at 429.
17. See, e.g., Her Majesty, Queen of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161,
1163 (9th Cir. 1979); Sangiovanni Hernandez v. Dominicana Aviacion, C. por A., 556
F.2d 611, 614 (1st Cir. 1977); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453
F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
18. See, e.g., Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tenn. 1978); Nicol v. Tanner,
310 Minn. 68, 75-76, 256 N.W.2d 796, 800 (1976); Johnston v. Compagnie G~nfrale
Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926).
19. The Supreme Court could decide that foreign judgment recognition affects
United States foreign relations to the extent that it must be governed by a uniform federal law. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 39-40. Several commentators call for
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relates to a federal question, a federal court may be required to apply
federal law.2" In most cases, however, state law will control.
D.

Requirementsfor Recognition and Enforcement

State recognition laws derive from the principles laid out in Hilton v.
Guyot.2 ' Even though the holding in Erie Railway Co. v. Tompkins,22
which did away with federal common law in diversity cases,2" nullified
Hilton's precedential value as federal common law, many domestic states
have adopted the law of Hilton. 4
In addition to utilizing common law derived from Hilton, some United
States states have adopted the Uniform Recognition Act,2 5 the relevant
provisions of which do not differ greatly from the rule of Hilton. The
sources of recognition law in the United States, therefore, are the state
common law derived from Hilton and the Uniform Recognition Act.
1. Recognition of Foreign Judgments under Hilton and Subsequent
State Common Law
Early United States decisions on the recognition of foreign judgments
held that a foreign judgment was prima facie evidence of the underlying
claim and that all defenses that were or could have been raised in the
foreign action could be relitigated in a United States action.2" Gradually,
United States courts began to recognize foreign judgments as conclusive
on the merits as long as basic requirements were met.27 The United
States Supreme Court set out these requirements in Hilton v. Guyot:2 8
[Wihere there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before
a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and
under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administrathe federalization of foreign judgment recognition law. See, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at
343-49.
20. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 39 nn.6-7.
21. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). For a description of these principles, see infra notes 27-37
and accompanying text.

22. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
23. Id. at 76-78.
24. Bishop & Burnette, supra note 3, at 430 ("[Tlhe Hilton language still remains
the predominant statement of the elements which must exist before a foreign-country
judgment will be recognized in the United States.").
25. UNIFORM RECOGNITION Acr, supra note 8.
26. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 43.
27. Id. at 44.

28. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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tion of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other
countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in
the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the
judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this nation should
not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an action
brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new
trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment
was erroneous in law or in fact.2"
In addition to these elements, the Hilton Court also required reciprocity in the recognition of judgments and refused to recognize the French
judgment at issue in Hilton because a United States judgment would not
be given conclusive effect in France."0 Commentators criticize3 ' and subsequent United States courts usually reject this additional requirement as
a requisite for recognition.32 Only a few United States states retain the
reciprocity requirement. 33
The Court in Hilton also made it clear that it would not enforce a
foreign judgment that contravenes the public policy of the United
States.3
United States courts have universally adopted this
35
requirement.
In addition to the elements presented in Hilton, most United States
courts require a foreign judgment be final in order to be recognized. 6
Under the common law developed in Hilton and subsequent cases, a
litigant must show the following elements before a United States court
will recognize a foreign judgment:
1) jurisdiction of the foreign court over the parties and subject-matter;
2) timely and proper notice of the proceedings;
3) regular proceedings conducted according to a system of impartial, civi-

29. Id. at 202-03.
30. Id. at 228.
31. See, e.g., Bishop & Burnette, supra note 3, at 435-36; von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 14, at 1660-62.
32. See, e.g., Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Somportex
Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 n.8 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
33. See, e.g., Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp, 665 F.2d 515, 516-19 (5th
Cir. 1981) (noting that under Texas law, reciprocity is still a requirement for recognition
of foreign judgments).
34. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164-65.
35. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 61.
36. See Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974); Coulborn v. Joseph, 195 Ga. 723, 733, 25 S.E.2d 576, 581
(1943); Kordoski v. Belanger, 52 R.I. 268, 160 A. 205 (1932); see generally von Mehren
& Patterson, supra note 2, at 69-72.
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lized jurisprudence;
4) absence of fraud in procuring the foreign judgment;
5) finality of the foreign judgment; and
6) no contravention of the public policy of the state in which enforcement
is sought by the foreign judgment.3

2.

Recognition of Foreign Judgments under the Uniform Act

Seventeen states have adopted 8 the Uniform Recognition Act.39 The
purpose of the Uniform Recognition Act is to codify the common law
and to increase the likelihood that United States judgments will be recognized abroad in states with reciprocity requirements.4 °
The Uniform Recognition Act applies only to foreign judgments that
grant or deny recovery of a sum of money, other than a tax judgment or
other penalty, or that are for support in matrimonial or family matters.41
42
The Act codifies the requirement of finality of the foreign judgment.
The Act further provides that a foreign judgment is not conclusive if the
foreign court was not impartial,43 did not have personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, 44 or did not have jurisdiction over the subject-matter at
issue in the case. 45 The Act also provides that a foreign judgment need
not be recognized if the defendant did not have notice of the suit and an
opportunity to defend against any claims, 46 if the judgment was obtained
by fraud,47 or if the underlying cause of action or claim for relief is
repugnant to the public policy of the United States state. 48 The Uniform
Recognition Act does not therefore differ greatly from the common law
developed under Hilton.

37. See generally von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 43-63.
38.

13 U.L.A. 19 (Supp. 1989). As of this writing, the Uniform Recognition Act has

been adopted by Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Texas, and Washington. Id.
39. UNIFORM RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8.
40. See Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. 261 (1986); see also von Mehren & Patterson,
supra note 2, at 42.
41. UNIFORM RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8, § 1.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 2.
§ 4(a)(1).
§ 4(a)(2).
§ 4(a)(3).
§ 4(b)(1).
§ 4(b)(2).
§ 4(b)(3).
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Current Recognition Practice in the United States

1. Jurisdiction
Under Hilton v. Guyot, a foreign court rendering the judgment must
have "jurisdiction over the cause" if the foreign judgment is to be recognized by a United States court.4 9 When a foreign judgment is rendered
against an United States national, United States courts have held that
"jurisdiction... should be determined by our own standards of judicial
power as promulgated by the Supreme Court under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 5 This jurisdictional test is the
same as that used by United States courts to determine if a United States
state judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. Courts have adopted
this "minimum contacts" test, which is set out in InternationalShoe v.
Washington5 and its progeny,5 2 to test foreign jurisdiction.5 3 Courts typically find "minimum contacts" exist when the defendant conducted business in the foreign jurisdiction54 or shipped products to the foreign
jurisdiction.55
The defendant may consent to the foreign court's jurisdiction. This
consent may be explicit in a prior agreement between the parties5" or it
may be implied if the defendant appears and participates in the foreign
proceeding.5 7 United States courts recognize jurisdiction based on consent, even though the foreign court may not have any other basis for
49. 159 U.S. 113, 167 (1895).
50. Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp. 885, 895 (N.D. Tex. 1980)
(quoting Cherun v. Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292, 296 (D.D.C. 1964)); see also von
Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 48-49 (noting that United States courts will not
recognize foreign judgments unless jurisdiction over the parties was acquired in a manner
"consonant with U.S. concepts of due process").
51. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
52. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
53. See Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 838 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying "minimum contacts" test of InternationalShoe).
54. See, e.g., Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 838.
55. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d
Cir 1971), cert denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
56. See, e.g., Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973)
(finding consent to Netherland Antilles law and jurisdiction as part of the contract between the parties), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
57. See, e.g., Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 631 F. Supp. 314, 317 (N.D.
Il. 1986), affid, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987); Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v.
Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co., 470 F. Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Ramm v. Ramm,
34 A.D.2d 667, 310 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1970), affd, 28 N.Y.2d 892, 271 N.E.2d 558, 322
N.Y.S.2d 726 (1971); see also von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 54.
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jurisdiction."' A United States court will not deem the defendant to have
consented to the foreign court's jurisdiction if the defendant's appearance
in the foreign court was solely to contest the foreign court's jurisdiction. 9
If the defendant loses the jurisdictional argument abroad, most United
States courts hold that he may not re-litigate the jurisdictional issue in
the United States.8 0 This is consistent with the United States practice
that prevents a defendant from re-litigating a jurisdictional issue if he
goes to another United States state to challenge that state's jurisdiction
and loses. 1 At least one United States court allowed the defendant to relitigate the foreign court's jurisdiction, 2 possibly out of concern that deferring to the foreign court's determination of jurisdiction would mean
that United States due process standards for determining jurisdiction
would not be met.8 3
Under the Uniform Recognition Act, a foreign judgment is not conclusive if the rendering court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant."
The Uniform Recognition Act lists six instances in which a United
States state court must recognize a foreign court's jurisdiction. 5 These
instances are limited to those in which the defendant (1) was personally
served in the foreign jurisdiction;" (2) appeared voluntarily in the foreign proceeding other than to contest jurisdiction; 7 (3) agreed to submit
to the jurisdiction of the foreign court prior to the action;" (4) was domiciled in the foreign state; 9 (5) had a business office in the foreign state
and the suit arose out of the conduct of that business; 0 or (6) operated a
58. See von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 54.
59. See, e.g., Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 491 F. Supp. 404, 406
(S.D. Tex. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 665 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1981).
60. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,
cert denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco
(Prod. & Metals) Co., 470 F. Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
61. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931). The court
in Somportex relied on Baldwin in refusing to allow the defendant to relitigate the jurisdictional issue in the United States courts. Somportex, 453 F.2d at 441 n.9.
62. Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp. 885, 895-97 (N.D. Tex.

1980).
63. See Bishop & Burnette, supra note 3, at 433.
64. UNIFORM RECOGNITION AcT, supra note 8, § 4(a)(2).
65. Id. § 5(a).
66. Id. § 5(a)(1). But see id. § 4(b)(6) (allowing the court not to recognize jurisdiction based solely on personal service if the foreign forum was "seriously
inconvenient").
67. Id. § 5(a)(2).

68.

Id. § 5(a)(3).

69.

Id. § 5(a)(4).

70. Id. § 5(a)(5).
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motor vehicle or aircraft in the foreign jurisdiction and the suit arose out
of that operation."1 It seems clear that the jurisdiction contemplated by
the Act is jurisdiction according to United States principles, 72' especially
since the Uniform Recognition Act also provides that a United States
court can recognize the foreign judgment on grounds for jurisdiction not
specified in the Act.7
2.

Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard

The United States Supreme Court required in Hilton v. Guyot that
there be "due citation" of the defendant in a foreign action before the
judgment would be recognized by United States courts.7 4 Courts have
construed this requirement to mean that the defendant must receive such
notice of the foreign action as would give him an opportunity to defend
the action.7 5 This issue only arises in the case of default judgments because a defendant's appearance in a foreign action is conclusive proof of
sufficient notice. While the rule seems to be that "effective service of
process" is required for adequate notice,7 United States courts are primarily concerned with whether the defendant had actual notice and do
not generally consider the sufficiency of the foreign state's statutory notice provisions. 7 United States courts also do not require that the service
of process comply with United States statutory notice provisions. 78
In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, the court held that personal service on a defendant in
Israel was sufficient even though the service papers were in Hebrew, a
language which the defendant did not understand. 9 The defendant in
that case had done business in Israel for a number of years and the facts
indicated that he was aware of the legal nature of the papers."0 The
court held that under those circumstances the defendant "should have
surmised that the papers being served upon him were legal in nature and
that he could ignore them only at his own peril."8 Consequently, the
71. Id. § 5(a)(6).
72. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 49 n.58.
73. UNIFORm RECOGNrrxON AcT, supra note 8, § 5(b).

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
quire
79.
80.
81.

159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895).
See Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id.
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 58.
Tahan, 662 F.2d at 866 ("It would be unrealistic for the United States to reall foreign judicial systems to adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
Id.
Id. at 865.
Id.
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court found that the defendant was provided sufficient notice. 2
The Uniform Recognition Act provides that a court may, at its discretion, refuse to recognize a foreign judgment if there is insufficient notice
of the foreign action to the defendant.8 3 Despite the discretionary nature
of this provision, it seems unlikely that any United States court would
recognize a foreign judgment when there has been lack of notice.8
3.

"Civilized Jurisprudence"

The United States Supreme Court noted in Hilton v. Guyot that the
court rendering the foreign judgment must operate under an impartial
civilized system of jurisprudence before a United States court will recognize the foreign judgment.85 In practice, however, United States courts
rarely examine a foreign state's judicial system for fairness and impartiality.8 6 One case in which a federal court did make such an examination
involved the recognition of an East German judgment.8 7 The United
States court refused to recognize the judgment because "East German
courts do not speak as an independent judiciary" 8 and "any logical
analysis [in East German judicial decisions] is obfuscated by their obvious political mission."8 "
The Uniform Recognition Act provides that a foreign judgment is not
conclusive if the judicial system rendering it does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process." The official comment to this section indicates that a "mere difference in the procedural system is not a sufficient basis for non-recognition." 1 A federal court applying Illinois law recently held that mere
allegations that the foreign court was "biased" or denied the defendant a
"full and fair opportunity to present its claims" are insufficient to render
92
a foreign judgment inconclusive under the Uniform Recognition Act.

82. Id.
83. UNIFORM RECOGNITION ACr, supra note 8, § 4(b)(1).
84. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 57 n.102.
85. 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895); see von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 59.
86. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 59.
87. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), modified, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971).
88. Id. at 906.
89. Id. at 907.
90. UNIFORM RECOGNITION AcT, supra note 8, § 4(a)(1).
91. Id. § 4 comment.
92. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 631 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ill. 1986),
affid, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987). Under the Uniform Recognition Act, supra note 8,
a foreign judgment must be conclusive before a United States court will recognize and
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Absence of Fraud

In Hilton v. Guyot, the United States Supreme Court held that a foreign judgment is not entitled to recognition if the judgment was procured
by fraud.9 3 United States courts distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud. If the fraud in procuring the foreign judgment is intrinsic-that is, if the fraud is "relate[d] to matters ... that [were or] could
have been litigated""' in the foreign proceeding"-then United States
courts generally will recognize the foreign judgment. 5 If, on the other
hand, the fraud is extrinsic-that is, if the "fraud... deprives a party of
an opportunity to present adequately his claim or his defense""--United
States courts will bar recognition of the.foreign judgment." At least one
court held that extrinsic fraud must also be a "fraud on the [foreign]
court" in order to bar recognition of the foreign judgment. 8 The burden
is on the defendant to prove fraud in the procurement of the foreign
judgment by "clear and convincing evidence." 9 The Uniform Recognition Act provides that a court may deny recognition of a foreign judgment if the judgment was "obtained by fraud."1 00 Most courts construe
this language to mean extrinsic fraud.1"'
5. Finality of Foreign Judgment
A foreign judgment must be final and conclusive in order to be enforced in the United States. 0 2 A United States court, therefore, will not
recognize a foreign interlocutory judgment or any foreign judgment not

enforce the judgment. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
93. 159 U.S. 113, 205 (1895); see Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum
Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 442 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); von Mchren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 59 ("United States courts uniformly state that recognition of a foreign country judgment will be denied if the judgment was procured by
fraud.").
94. Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co., 470 F.
Supp. 610, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting Overmyer v. Eliot Realty, 83 Misc. 2d 694,
705, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 246, 258 (1975)).
95. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 60.
96. Bishop & Burnette, supra note 3, at 434.
97. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 60.
98. Fairchild,470 F. Supp. at 615.
99. Clarkson Co., v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 631 (2d Cir. 1976).
100. UNIFORM RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8, § 4(b)(2).
101. See, e.g., Fairchild,470 F. Supp. at 615.
102. See, e.g., Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1323 (2d Cir. 1973);
see also von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 69.
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final in the foreign court. 10 3 If, however, the foreign judgment is final in
the rendering forum but is merely amenable to appeal, most United
States courts will recognize the judgment unless an appeal is actually
pending."" The Uniform Recognition Act allows recognition of a foreign
judgment "that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered
even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal.*7'
Under the Uniform Recognition Act, if a defendant satisfies a United
States court that an appeal in the foreign jurisdiction is pending or that
the defendant intends to appeal the foreign judgment, the United States
court may stay the recognition and enforcement proceedings until after
the appeal has been decided or the time to appeal has expired.108 The
Uniform Recognition Act also allows a United States court to refuse to
recognize a foreign judgment if it "conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment."' 07 The Uniform Recognition Act does not specify,
however, which of the two judgments, if any, a United States court
should recognize.'0 The few courts that have addressed this issue have
applied the United States rule applicable to judgments of domestic
states, 10 9 which mandates that the last in a series of inconsistent judgments prevails." °
6.

The Public Policy Exception

The United States Supreme Court made it clear in Hilton v. Guyot
that it would not recognize a foreign judgment if doing so contravenes
the public policy of the United States."' The public policy exception is
not very well-defined. Theoretically, a defendant could claim a violation
of public policy any time there is a variance between the procedure or
result in a foreign court and in a United States court. Courts seldom find
public policy violations, however, and defendants are rarely able to block
recognition of a foreign judgment on public policy grounds. 2 Even if a

103. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 69.
104. Id. at 69-70.
105. UNIFORM RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8, § 2; see von Mehren & Patterson,
supra note 2, at 70.
106. UNIFORM RECOGNITION ACT,supra note 8, § 6; see von Mehren & Patterson,
supra note 2, at 70.
107. UNIFORM RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 8, § 4(b)(4).
108. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 71.
109. See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 75-78 (1939).
110. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 71.
111. 159 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1895); see von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 61.
112. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 931 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) ("The standard for refusing to enforce judgments on public policy grounds is
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variance between the law or practice in the foreign jurisdiction and that
in the United States is great, this difference generally will not cause a
court to find a public policy violation.1 1 Indeed, in Hilton, the Supreme
Court found no violation when the foreign jurisdiction rendering the
judgment did not allow cross examination of witnesses and permitted
hearsay and unsworn testimony, all contrary to the practice of United
States courts. 11 4 A court will refuse recognition on public policy grounds
only if recognition "injure[s] the public health, the public morals, the
public confidence in the purity of the administration of the law, or...
undermine[s] that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen ought to feel."1 1 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that, in order to violate public policy, the foreign judgment must be
"repugnant to fundamental notions of what is fair and just."'1 " While
some courts use the public policy exception as a "catch-all" basis for
denying recognition,"' most courts find public policy violations only
when recognition is "unfair to a party entitled to the protection of the
policies of the [recognition] forum,""' 8 or when "the recognition forum
itself has an interest in the judgment other than that of protecting the
litigants."' " 9
The Uniform Recognition Act allows a United States court to refuse
recognition if "the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of the state."'"2 The Act's
public policy exception to recognition is more restrictive than the common law public policy exception generally applied by the courts. 2

strict.").
113. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 61.
114. 159 U.S. at 204-05; see also von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 61.
115. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161, 169
(E.D. Pa. 1970), affd, 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017
(1972) (quoting Goodyear v. Brown, 155 Pa. 514, 518, 26 A. 665, 666 (1893)).
116. Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
117. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 61 (noting that the public policy
exception has been used in cases of lack of jurisdiction, inadequate notice, and fraud).
118. Id. at 63.
119.

Id.

120. UNIFORM RECOGNITION AcT, supra note 8, § 4(b)(3) (bracketed text in
original).
121. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 61 n.129.
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III.

CASES CONSTRUING THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

Because the public policy exception is quite vague, it is tempting to
use it as a "catch-all" objection to the recognition of any foreign judgment. The following cases illustrate the ways in which parties attempt to
use the public policy exception to bar recognition of foreign judgments.
This Part first discusses unsuccessful attempts to use the public policy
exception and then discusses cases in which courts have applied the exception. This Part concludes with a summary of the factors courts consider in applying the exception.
A.

Public Policy Exception Not Recognized

In Curacaov. Solitron Devices, Inc., the defendant, a New York electronics manufacturer, sought non-recognition of a foreign arbitral
award.1 22 The defendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff, the
government of Curacao, whereby the plaintiff would build an industrial
park on the island and the defendant would operate a manufacturing
plant in the industrial park that would provide at least one hundred jobs
for citizens of the island. 23 The defendant never established a business
on the island, and the dispute went into arbitration pursuant to the
terms of the contract.' 24 The defendant never took part in the arbitration
proceedings, although it was informed of all dates of hearings and procedures followed.12 5 The arbitral tribunal granted the plaintiff an award,
and the plaintiff sought enforcement of the award in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.126
The defendant's defense was that it breached the contract because the
wage rate on the island rose as a result of the plaintiff's actions and that
such a wage rate rendered it impossible for the defendant to operate its
business there. 2 7 In essence, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff, as
a result of its own misconduct, derived an advantage in the form of the
damages awarded in the arbitration. 2 The plaintiff's derivation of this
advantage violated New York law, and the defendant claimed that recognition of the award would, accordingly, violate the public policy of New
York.1 29 The court rejected this argument, but never reached the issue of
122.

489 F.2d 1313, 1314 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).

123.

Id. at 1315.

124.

Id. at 1315-16.

125.

Id.

126.

Id. at 1314.

127.

Id. at 1315-16.

128.

Id. at 1322.

129.

Id.
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whether the defendant had stated grounds for the public policy exception
to apply. The court instead found that the plaintiff and defendant never
agreed that the plaintiff would keep the wage rate on the island constant.1 30 Because the constant wage rate was not part of the contract, the
plaintiff did not cause the defendant to breach the agreement. Since the
plaintiff did no wrong, it could not derive an advantage from the alleged
wrongdoing. 1 '
This case illustrates that the party seeking non-recognition bears an
initial burden of production. At a minimum, the party must show that
there is a variance between the foreign jurisdiction's treatment of the
party and the way a United States court would treat that party. If, as in
Curacao, the United States court could reach the same result as the foreign jurisdiction, the United States court will not examine the foreign
court's action.
An attempt to invoke the public policy exception may prove unsuccessful even if the United States court would reach a result different from
that reached by the foreign court. This is especially true if the party
seeking to invoke the public policy exception defaulted in the foreign
court. In Tahan v. Hodgson 3 2 the defendant sought non-recognition of
an Israeli default judgment against him. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia refused to recognize the Israeli judgment because it found that the judgment violated the United States policy in two ways. 3 ' First, the district court found that under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant would have been entitled to a
"second notice" prior to the entry of a default judgment against him.3 4
Since the Israeli court did not give the defendant a second notice, the
Israeli judgment violated public policy in the United States.' 3 ' Second,
the district court held that because the Israeli court found the defendant
personally liable for the actions of his corporation, the Israeli judgment
violated United States policy against "piercing the corporate veil."' 3 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed both of these district court findings. In reversing the district
court's first finding, the court relied on Hilton v. Guyot 3 7 to hold that a
"mere difference" in procedure does not constitute a violation of public
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 866.
Id.
Id.
Id.
159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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policy. 38 The court noted that the Israeli notice procedures are not "repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just," and, therefore do not violate United States public policy. 9 In reversing the district
court's second finding, the court held that Israel also has a policy against
piercing the corporate veil. " The United States court held that because
in the Israeli court the defendant could have claimed freedom from liability for the actions of the corporation, 4 the defendant "cannot fail to
contest the Israeli plaintiff and then declare that he would have won." 2
The court, without saying so, hinted that a United States court faced
with the same case might also have pierced the corporate veil. " 3
In Tahan, the defendant attempted to use the public policy exception
to make an argument that he could have made in the foreign jurisdiction.
The court found that the defendant had proper notice and an opportunity to defend the Israeli action."
The court, therefore, held that it
would not examine the Israeli court's decision to pierce the corporate veil
to determine whether it violated United States public policy. 5 It seems
clear that had the defendant appeared in the Israeli action and lost an
argument against "piercing the veil," the United States court would have
made such an examination. The court noted that the Israeli court's decision to pierce the veil is "not repugnant" to United States public policy
"particularly when it is borne in mind that defendant did not present a
case at all [in the Israeli action]." 6 This dictum suggests that a United
States court will not entertain a public policy defense when the defendant defaulted on the issue that is the basis of such defense in the foreign
action. While not amounting to a general rule, " a defendant's default in
a foreign adjudication should cut off his right to re-argue the merits of

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Tahan, 662 F.2d at 866 n.18.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 867.
Id.
Id.
Id. ("Our examination of the record . . . convinces us that the Israeli court's

decision to pierce the corporate veil is not 'repugnant' under the facts of this case.").

144. Id. at 865. The defendant also argued that the United States court should not
recognize the Israeli judgment because he did not receive effective notice of the action.

For a discussion of the court's ruling on this argument, see supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.

145.

662 F.2d at 867.

146.

Id.

147. See Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 842 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting the notion in Tahan that a defendant should not be allowed to raise a public policy defense if
he defaulted on the same issue in the foreign action). For a discussion of Ackermann, see
infra notes 179-196 and accompanying text.
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the case in an enforcement proceeding in the United States. A defendant
who defaults in the foreign proceeding should only be allowed to use the
public policy exception if his appearance in the foreign action would not
have given him the possibility of obtaining a result similar to that which
a United States court could have reached.
In Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger, 48 the plaintiff, who
employed the defendant in Belgium, brought a declaratory judgment action in a United States state court seeking a declaration that it did not
owe the defendant termination benefits. The defendant had the case removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois and counterclaimed for enforcement of a Belgian judgment
awarding him a sum of money for termination benefits. 49 The defendant
had previously brought an action against the plaintiff in the Belgian
courts seeking termination benefits from the plaintiff.1 8 0 The plaintiff
claimed that the Belgian judgment violated United States public policy
because the Belgian court chose to apply Belgian, rather than Illinois,
law to the dispute."" The plaintiff claimed that the choice of law violated public policy because the employment contract between the plaintiff and the defendant specified that Illinois law would govern the contract.'8 2 The plaintiff argued that since the public policy of Illinois
favored freedom of contact, this action violated Illinois's public policy.1" 3
The district court found no violation of public policy because it was not
clearly inappropriate for the Belgian court to apply Belgian law. Indeed,
the district court noted, "[Flaced with the issue, this court may well have
reached the same conclusion [on choice of law] as the Belgian courts."'"
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit made it clear in Tahan that if a party defaults in a foreign judgment, United States courts will not hear the party's claim that the foreign court's judgment violated public policy if the party's appearance in
the foreign action would have given it the opportunity to argue for a
result similar to one which a United States court could reach." 5 The
court in Tahan did not address the question of what would happen if
the party invoking the public policy exception appeared in the foreign

148.
149.
months
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

631 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Il1. 1986), affd, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 315. The Belgian court ruled in Granger's favor approximately seven
after this action was filed. Id. at 316.
833 F.2d at 682.
631 F. Supp. at 318.
833 F.2d at 688-89.
Id.
631 F. Supp. at 318.
Tahan v. Hodgson, 602 F.2d 862, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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action and lost. As Ingersoll illustrates, such a party must be able to
prove to the United States court that a United States court could not
reach a result similar to the foreign court.
The public policy argument may fail even if the result obtained in the
foreign action is one not obtainable in the United States. In Somportex
Ltd. v. PhiladelphiaChewing Gum Corp.,' the plaintiff, a British corporation, and the defendant, a United States corporation, entered into an
agreement whereby the plaintiff would distribute the defendant's bubble
gum in Great Britain.1 5 When the transaction fell through, the plaintiff
sued the defendant in a British court for breach of contract.15 8 The defendant was served in the United States under a British "long-arm" statute and the defendant appeared in the British action, but only to contest
the British court's jurisdiction. 5 9 When the defendant lost on this issue,
it did not participate further in the British proceedings, but instead withdrew from the case and presented no defense.1 60 The British court then
entered a default judgment against the defendant."6 The plaintiff filed a
diversity action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking enforcement of the British judgment. The
district court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and
the defendant appealed.' 6 2
The defendant again argued that the British court did not have jurisdiction over it. In addition, the defendant claimed that the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania should not recognize the British judgment because it violated the public policy of Pennsylvania. The British court awarded damages for "loss of good will" and
attorney's fees.' 6 3 The defendant claimed that since Pennsylvania law
does not permit recovery for "loss of good will" and attorney's fees, the
British judgment awarding those damages violated the public policy of
4
Pennsylvania and should not be recognized.'
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected both of these arguments, finding first that the British court
had jurisdiction over the defendant by virtue of the defendant's initial
appearance in the British proceeding, and, second, that the British
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
Id. at 436.
Id. at 437.
Id.
Id. at 438-39.
Id. at 439.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 443.
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court's exercise of jurisdiction did not offend United States notions of due
process.'"6 The court dispensed with the defendant's public policy argument by noting simply that, although the damages awarded are not
available under Pennsylvania law, recognizing them would not "injure
the public health, the public morals [or] the public confidence in the
1 66
purity of the administration of the law."
Courts seem particularly unwilling to entertain public policy arguments in cases where the party seeking application of the public policy
exception initiated and participated in the foreign action. Sangiovanni
Hernandez v. Dominicana de Aviacion, C. por A. provides a good example of this unwillingness.1 6 7 In Sangiovanni Hernandez, the plaintiff
sued the defendant in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico, seeking damages for the wrongful death of his father resulting from the crash of an airliner operated by the defendant.1 6 ' The defendant sought dismissal of the action on res judicata grounds, pointing
out that the defendant paid the plaintiff $40,000 pursuant to a settlement before a court in the Dominican Republic. 69 The district court
refused to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the foreign settlement was not recognizable since it violated the public policy of Puerto
Rico.170 The district court specifically found that Puerto Rico has a
strong policy of protecting minors and that this policy is embodied in
laws that govern the procedure used in settling lawsuits involving minors. 17 ' The district court went on to find that the plaintiff was a minor
at the time of the Dominican settlement and that because the Dominican
court did not follow the procedures required by Puerto Rican law, the
settlement violated the public policy of Puerto Rico and, therefore, was
not entitled to recognition.1" 2 The United States Court of Appeals .for the
First Circuit reversed, holding that the difference in procedures was insufficient to violate the public policy of Puerto Rico.17 The court found
that the procedures used by the Dominican court sufficiently protected
the interests of the minor plaintiff.17 4 Since the "heart of Puerto Rico's

165.
166.
(1893)).
167.
168.
169.
170.

171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 442, 444.
Id. at 443 (quoting Goodyear v. Brown, 155 Pa. 514, 518, 26 A. 665, 666
556 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1977).
Id. at 612.
Id. at 612, 615.
Id. at 614-15.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 615.
Id.
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policy" is to protect the interests of the minor, the court found that there
was no public policy violation.175
The court had little sympathy for the plaintiff in this case, noting that
the defendant had "in good faith entered into and fully complied with
the [Dominican] settlement." 6' The Dominican court clearly had jurisdiction over the claim and the parties, and there was no allegation of
fraud. The only reason that United States courts had jurisdiction over
the claim was because the plaintiff moved to Puerto Rico prior to the
crash. 7' At the time of the crash, all of the parties involved were citizens
of the Dominican Republic.1' 8 After the crash, the plaintiff could have
easily brought the action in United States federal district court in Puerto
Rico, but instead chose to settle the case in the Dominican Republic. It
was only after a voluntary settlement in the Dominican Republic that
the plaintiff sought to try the case in a United States court. Allowing the
suit would have violated the principles behind res judicata and would
have created an inequity for the defendant, who had settled the case in
good faith. But for the existence of the public policy exception, the plaintiff could not have made his claim. The public policy exception should
not exist to allow a plaintiff "two bites at the apple." Because there was
no unfairness to the plaintiff, the court refused to recognize the public
policy exception in this case. As this case illustrates, courts should be
particularly unwilling to apply the public policy exception when the
party seeking to avoid recognition of the foreign judgment is the one who
initiated the foreign proceedings.
B.

Public Policy Exception Recognized

In Ackermann v. Levine, the plaintiff sought recognition and enforcement of a German default judgment against the defendant."' 9 The defendant sought German financial backers for a real estate development in
New Jersey. 8 0 The defendant hired the plaintiff, a German attorney, to
negotiate with some potential investors in West Germany.' 8' No fees
were discussed for the plaintiffs services. The plaintiff later sent the

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
830 (2d
180.
181.

Id.

Id. at 615-16.
Id. at 612.

Id.
610 F. Supp. 633, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd in part, rev'd in part, 788 F.2d
Cir. 1986).
788 F.2d at 834-36.
Id.
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defendant a bill for his work,"8 2 based on a West German statute that set
out a permissible rate schedule."a 3 The plaintiff won a default judgment
in a West German court and subsequently sought enforcement of the
judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York."8 ' The district court held that New York policy requires attorneys to ensure full comprehension by the client of the fee agreement
and that the statutory billing practice used in West Germany fails similarly to provide. 8 5 The court held that the West German judgment
therefore violated the public policy of New York and refused to recognize the judgment.1 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed in part, holding that the statutory billing scheme was
not so offensive to New York policy that it required nonrecognition. s
The court further found that the defendant benefitted in part from the
plaintiff's labor.18 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did find a
violation of New York's public policy in one respect. The court held that
New York law required some evidence both that the client authorized
and that the attorney actually performed the work for which the attorney
sought payment.1 9 Part of the German judgment included fees for
"study of project files." The court found that there was no authorization
for this study and that "there was not a scintilla of evidence of work
product."' 90 The court held that recognizing this aspect of the judgment
would run the "risk that American courts could become the means of
enforcing unconscionable attorney fee awards" and that this might "endanger[] 'public confidence' in the administration of the law."1 '
The court specifically rejected the dictum in Tahan which implied
that a defendant who defaulted in a foreign action could not raise the
public policy exception as a defense. 9 2 In this way, Ackerman is arguably distinguishable from Tahan. In Tahan, the defendant could have
argued that the Israeli court should not have pierced the corporate veil;
the court in Tahan found that the defendant could have made this claim

182. Id. at 835, 837.
183. Id. at 837.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

841.
843.
844.
843-44.

190. Id. at 845.
191. Id. at 844.

192. Id. at 842.
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as a matter of Israeli law. 19 3 In Ackerman, however, the court, by claiming that the plaintiff had no evidence of having performed the work, did
not determine whether the defendant could have challenged the German
judgment in German courts. The opinion does not reveal whether the
court examined the German law to see if such a defense is allowable. If
German law does not allow such a defense, the court was correct in
finding a public policy violation.
In most cases in which courts find public policy violations, there is at
stake some interest of the forum greater than merely protecting the litigant."' In Ackerman, the state of New York had a great interest in not
enforcing unconscionable attorney fees. As the court noted, recognizing
the foreign judgment would have "impose[d] upon American citizens doing business abroad a unique risk in dealing with foreign counsel."1 5
Avoiding this risk was clearly worth non-recognition of this particular
judgment; indeed, the court hinted that recognition of the judgment
would hurt transnational legal relations. 9 6 The best interests of both the
United States and West Germany arguably required non-recognition of
the judgment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit faced similar concerns with the forum's interests in Laker Airways
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines.197 In Laker Airways, the plaintiff, a
British airline, sought an injunction from the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia enjoining the defendants KLM and
Sabena-Dutch and Belgian airlines-from seeking an injunction
against the plaintiff in the British courts. 9 8 The litigation arose out of
Laker's antitrust suit against numerous other airlines.199 Laker originally filed an antitrust action in the United States courts.200 Certain
British airlines, which were defendants in the United States anti trust
action, then filed suit in the British courts seeking an injunction preventing Laker from pursuing its claims against them in the United States
courts.20 ' The injunction was ultimately granted.20 2 In the meantime,

193.

Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

194. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 63.
195.

788 F.2d at 830, 844 (2d Cir. 1986).

196.

Id.

197.

731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984), affg Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American

World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983).
198. 731 F.2d at 918.
199.

Id. at 917-18.

200. Id. at 917.
201.

Id. at 918.

202. Id. at 920.
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Laker filed an action in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia seeking an anti-suit injunction which would prevent the
remaining defendant airlines from seeking injunctions against Laker in
the British courts. 08 This injunction was granted, and the defendants
appealed.20 4 Affirming the district court's grant of the injunction, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that the injunction was warranted on public policy grounds. 0 5
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit did not refuse recognition of a foreign judgment, it held
that the public policy concerns behind the issuance of an anti-suit injunction were the same as the concerns behind non-recognition of foreign
judgments. 20 The court specifically held that the forum has a great interest in seeing that its important public policies are not evaded.20 7 The
court then held that the defendants in this case were attempting to "escape application of the antitrust laws to their conduct of business here in
the United States."20° Since the antitrust laws were "of admitted economic importance to the United States," the court held that United
States interest and, hence, public policy, mandated issuance of the antisuit injunction.20
In Overseas Inns S.A. v. United States,210 the plaintiff sued the Internal Revenue Service to receive back taxes that it claimed were wrongfully collected. 211 The plaintiff's predecessor was found to owe back
taxes to the IRS.212 While the tax dispute was pending before the United
States Tax Court, the plaintiff entered bankruptcy proceedings before a
Luxembourg court.21" The plaintiff and the IRS eventually settled the
tax claim, with the plaintiff agreeing to pay approximately one million
dollars in taxes.214 The Luxembourg court, aware that the IRS was a
creditor of the plaintiff, entered a reorganization plan for the plaintiff.2"
Under the terms of this plan, the IRS would receive approximately

203. Id. at 918.
204. Id. at 919.
205. Id. at 932.
206. Id. at 931.

207. Id.
208.

Id. at 932.

209. Id. at 931-32.
210. 685 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
211. Id. at 968.
212. Id. at 969.

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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$230,000.216 The IRS did not appear in the Luxembourg bankruptcy

proceeding, but it had notice of the proceedings and did not object to the
reorganization plan.2 1 The IRS later collected the additional money
owed it by levying upon the plaintiff's property in the United States. 1 8
The plaintiff sued in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas, seeking summary judgment on the Luxembourg
decree.2 1
The court refused to recognize the foreign decree on public policy
grounds,220 holding that the United States has an "inexpugnable public
221
policy that favors payment of lawfully owed federal income taxes.1
The plaintiff argued that the court should recognize the foreign judgment on the ground that the IRS would not have received any more
money in bankruptcy proceedings in the United States.2 22 The court held
that, in order to prevail on this claim, the plaintiff needed to show that
the IRS would have received comparable treatment under United States
and Luxembourg law. 22' Because the plaintiff could not meet this evidentiary burden, the court denied summary judgment.22 4
The same concerns that motivated the court in Laker Airways motivated the court in Overseas Inns. 225 The Overseas Inns court was concerned that the plaintiff was seeking recognition of the foreign bankruptcy judgment for the distinct purpose of avoiding the United States
tax laws.
C. Suggested Analysis for a Court Faced with the Public Policy
Exception
A United States court asked to refuse recognition of a foreign judgment on the ground that it violates public policy first needs to decide
whether the result reached in the foreign proceeding is in fact a different
result than a United States court would reach if faced with the same
issue.226 If there is a variance in the anticipated United States result and
the foreign judgment and if the foreign judgment was reached by default,
216. Id.
217.

Id.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 970.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 972.
Id. at 973-75.
Id.
Id. at 975.
685 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
See supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
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the United States court must next decide whether the foreign court could
have reached a result more in line with a United States result in a similar case. If this is the case, and if the party seeking non-recognition
would have received a more favorable result by appearing in the foreign
action, then the United States court should not refuse recognition of the
judgment on public policy grounds.22 7 Alternatively, if the foreign jurisdiction, as a result of its laws and practices, could not have reached a
result consistent with that reached by a United States court faced with
the same case, 22 further analysis is necessary.
When the potential results in the foreign and United States courts are
different, the United States court must determine whether the foreign
result is so inconsistent with United States law that the court should
deny recognition. The variance must be great229 and must generally affect some important United States interest. 30 For example, when recognition of the foreign judgment enables a party to escape the application
of United States laws to the party's conduct, the United States has a
great interest in applying its laws to that party's conduct.23 Finally,
courts should not entertain the public policy argument from a party who
initiates a foreign proceeding and then seeks non-recognition of the resulting foreign judgment in a United States court.232
IV.

CONCLUSION

There are many grounds for refusing to recognize and enforce foreign
judgments. Most of these grounds are rather specific, but the public policy exception is potentially quite broad. United States courts, however,
have applied the exception narrowly. In light of the myriad of policy
reasons for recognizing foreign judgments,2 33 courts construe grounds for
non-recognition as narrowly as possible. Courts utilize the public policy
exception as a "ground of last resort" for non-recognition, because the
other grounds for non-recognition serve adequately to protect the parties

227. See supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
228. Arguably, this is what happened in Ackermann. See supra notes 179-96 and
accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
230. See von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2, at 63.
231. See supra notes 197-225 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
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involved. Indeed, the public policy exception, unlike the other grounds
for non-recognition, properly serves to protect the interests of the state
where enforcement is sought, rather than the interests of the party seeking to invoke it. Viewed from this perspective, the limited application of
the public policy exception is quite rational.
Jonathan H. Pittman

